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The notion of ‘organised crime’ typically conjures up images 
of criminal gangs. Some mafia and bikie gangs do operate in 
parts of the Pacific and have featured in local and international 
media. However, we argue that understanding the threat of 
organised crime in the Pacific requires moving away from 
this popular perception. We suggest that the most significant 
organised crime involves the nexus between political elites 
and seemingly licit actors. Reframing ‘organised crime’ in this 
way provides us with a more nuanced understanding of its 
changing political economy in the region.
Little evidence exists that organised crime has infiltrated 
political elites in the Pacific as it has in some other parts of 
the world. Recent developments nevertheless indicate the 
potential for a deepening relationship between politics and 
organised crime with an increasingly transnational character. 
These include the expanding flow of money, goods and 
people associated with globalisation; the weakening of law 
enforcement and oversight agencies; and the region’s shifting 
geopolitics.
The logging sector provides the most visible nexus 
between organised crime and politicians. Papua New Guinea 
and Solomon Islands have a long history of illegal logging 
facilitated by an alliance between Asian logging companies 
and local political actors. This collusion has resulted in ‘the 
blurring of legal and illegal trade in relation to formal export-
oriented log production’ (UNODC 2013:93). Estimated net 
exports of illegal timber from both countries in 2010 were 
AU$800 million. The quasi-legitimate nature of organised 
crime groups and links to politicians is exemplified by Nauru. In 
2013, the Australian Federal Police uncovered emails showing 
that an Australian company was using inducements to obtain 
political backing for its phosphate mining operations on the 
island. As with logging, this is a case of a legitimate company 
operating illicitly with the active connivance of local elites.
Fisheries in the western and central Pacific are another area 
where organised crime mixes with politics. By monopolising 
licensing decisions, ministers and other officials have been 
accused of making deals with private operators for personal 
gain and at the expense of national revenue. Secretive access 
deals have also been at the centre of corruption allegations. 
While remaining a problem, some countries have significantly 
improved their fisheries governance. For example, Papua New 
Guinea has strengthened its legal framework and monitoring of 
foreign fishing fleets, and the Parties to the Nauru Agreement 
have initiated important regulatory reforms. Seabed mining — 
viewed by many as a new pathway to development — is likely 
to face many of the same challenges as fisheries, logging and 
onshore mining, including new opportunities for illicit activities.
Economic globalisation also shapes new opportunities 
for illicit transfers of funds and money laundering, involving 
local and transnational networks. In 2012, the head of Papua 
New Guinea’s Taskforce Sweep referred to Australia as the 
‘Cayman Islands of the Pacific’ owing to substantial funds 
allegedly laundered there by Papua New Guinea elites. A 
recent investigation by non-government organisation Global 
Witness showed how this laundering involves an elaborate 
network of banks, real estate markets, politicians and lawyers.
Despite these problems there is some evidence that 
the political drivers of organised crime can be addressed. 
Vanuatu was rocked by a series of political scandals involving 
alleged money laundering during the 1990s. In 2015, however, 
15 members of parliament were convicted and 14 imprisoned 
for bribery, suggesting a marked improvement in the 
independence and capabilities of the state’s regulatory system 
(Forsyth and Batley 2016). Strengthening anti-corruption 
responses is a key part of fighting organised crime in 
the Pacific.
Although considerable variation exists, the well-known 
frailties of Pacific law enforcement and oversight agencies 
tend to reflect systemic issues of governance and institutional 
capabilities, especially in the larger Melanesian countries. 
Such weaknesses present obvious vulnerabilities to organised 
crime, as well as ensuring immunity to many corrupt local 
actors. Few agencies are equipped to manage the complexity 
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and transnational dimensions of organised crime. Most 
Pacific audit offices have difficulty recruiting and training staff 
and have insufficient funds, poor facilities and low pay rates 
(PASAI 2015). Oversight agencies also experience political 
interference, including meddling with appointments, threats, 
reduction in funding and legislative changes designed to 
curtail their powers (Rawlings 2006).
The most egregious examples include the long-running 
saga in Papua New Guinea stemming from serious allegations 
levelled against prominent leaders by Taskforce Sweep. 
This has involved serial court challenges, dismissals of 
senior police officers and defunding the taskforce, and has 
fuelled perceptions of concerted efforts by political actors 
to evade legal processes. Similar machinations are evident 
in Nauru where anti-corruption efforts have been the target 
of sustained political attacks. Australia supports a range of 
Pacific-wide responses to organised crime. Despite this, its 
reliance on both countries to host offshore refugee processing 
facilities has not surprisingly tempered its willingness and 
ability to directly criticise local political leaders.
Pacific-wide responses to organised crime entail a number 
of regional organisations and networks including the Oceania 
Customs Organisation, Pacific Island Law Officers Network 
and the South Pacific Chiefs of Police Conference. Other 
bodies provide oversight and monitoring for specific industries 
like fisheries. The transnational dimensions of organised 
crime have seen increasing regional efforts to improve the 
collection and analysis of suspicious financial transactions, as 
well as information sharing across national borders, including 
establishing the Pacific Transnational Crime Network.
Despite some success, cooperation against organised 
criminal activities, particularly those with political dimensions, 
has not lived up to the lofty sentiments of various regional 
agreements. Unlike ordinary citizens, political leaders have 
access to state resources to defend themselves from 
investigation and prosecution. Responses are also stymied 
because of divergent priorities between member states. 
Australia and New Zealand may be worried about some forms 
of crime that resonate with international concerns, provided 
they don’t lead to an unravelling of their broader geopolitical 
interests. For example, Australia has been reluctant to speak 
out against corrupt money laundered into the country by 
Papua New Guinea elites in part due to the political importance 
of the Manus detention centre. Pacific governments generally 
have more pressing concerns, such as climate change and 
food security. This misalignment has seen a splintering of 
regional efforts. Cultural diversity also means that the region 
struggles to find a common sense of purpose, while the 
paucity of reliable data at regional and country levels adds to 
the difficulties.
Despite its popular association with nefarious characters 
and organisations, organised crime often hides behind a 
shroud of legitimacy, thereby blurring the boundaries between 
licit and illicit activities. In the Pacific, it frequently involves 
networks of political and other elite actors extending well 
beyond national borders. The opportunities for organised 
crime have intensified with economic globalisation that has 
seen international trade and the movement of people increase 
exponentially. Trade between the Pacific and Asia grew by 
800 per cent from 2000 to 2012 (ADB and ADBI 2015). While 
creating opportunities for some, it also increases the potential 
threat of organised crime. At the same time, organised crime 
is by no means path-dependent, as demonstrated by recent 
developments in Vanuatu and in some areas of fisheries 
governance.
Author Notes
Sinclair Dinnen is a senior fellow with the State, Society and 
Governance in Melanesia Program and Grant Walton is a 
research fellow with the Development Policy Centre. This In Brief 
draws on an earlier blog posting and discussion paper published 
by the Development Policy Centre.
References
ADB (Asian Development Bank) and ADBI (Asian Development 
Bank Institute) 2015. Pacific Opportunities: Leveraging 
Asia’s Growth. Manila: ADB.
Forsyth, M. and J. Batley 2016. What the Political Corruption 
Scandal of 2015 Reveals about Checks and Balances 
in Vanuatu Governance. The Journal of Pacific History 
51(3):255–277.
PASAI (Pacific Association of Supreme Audit Institutions) 2015. 
Leading by Example: Accountability and Transparency in 
the Pacific Region. Auckland: PASAI.
Rawlings, G. 2006. Regulating Responsively for Oversight 
Agencies in the Pacific. Targeted research paper for AusAID. 
Canberra: ANU.
UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime) 2013. 
Transnational Organized Crime in East Asia and the Pacific: 
A Threat Assessment. Bangkok: UNODC.
In Brief 2016/24  State, Society & Governance in Melanesia
